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GERMANY'S NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY 
From stable abnormality to a normality offlux1 
Ulf Hedetoft 
Aaalborg University 
This paper deals with the much-discussed question of German post-war identity, its 
(ab)normality and its evolution over recent years . The discussion is predicated on and 
rooted in the discourses and images of normality and nonnalization that have haunted the 
debate as either a desirable goal to be pursued by political and cultural actors in Gennany 
or as a negative ideal whose realization would involve the return ofGennany from being 
a subdued giant to--once again--being a political actor throwing its weight around and 
conducting politics according to great-power ambitions. On this view (which has by and 
large been found in neighbouring European countries scared of a repeat of history, but also 
within Germany), "normality" has a specific content spelling "realism", "maximization 
of power" and "withdrawal from European integration".' 
I This paper was presented at the biennial US-ECSA conference in Pittsburgh, June 3-5 
1999, in a roundtable on the Gennan Council Presidency, organized by Carl Lankowski. It is due 
to be published in a volume edited by Lankowski with Berghahn publishers. 
1 For a sound and detailed recent discussion of the Gennan normality debate and its 
ramifications for foreign policy stances, see Bach, 1999. 
This article proposes another take on the notions of normality and normalization. First of 
all, "normalization" is not conceived as implying a return to orthodox sovereignty or some 
other outdated model of international cooperation and hardline "Realpolitik", nor as 
involving a retreat from Europe. Basically, what constitutes nonnality and therefore 
normalization is not a predefined given consisting of specific contents and particular 
meanings, but is a question of relational perception and contextual value-ascription. 
Bluntly put, if a country sees itself and is seen by others as being a nonnal country 
behaving normally and with every right to a nonnal political identity, then so be it, 
independently of any specific feature that might characterize its polity, policies or 
behaviour. It all depends on how it is perceptually constructed, whether there IS 
consensual agreement on this construction, and what kind of value is ascribed to a country 
in the comparative context of international relations and internationally condoned practice. 
More specifically, "normality" can be conceived along three major axes: (a) relations 
between self-images and images of "others"; (b) relations with the national past; (c) 
political and cultural self-confidence--and ways oflinking and speaking to such issues. 
It is thus very significantly a question of political discourse, i.e. of the way in which such 
terms become handled and instrumentalized for specific goals, develop into nodal points 
of reference for understanding and (re)acting on particular developments. In this way, 
"normality" is a consensually based international construction with very real consequen-
ces for political practice, political style and political rhetoric. 
Specifically in the German context, "normality"/"normalization" is a question of 
overcoming the sharp edges of the dualities and oppositions of post-war history--ofbeing 
able to perceive and tackle this history as history and not as an unbearable dimension of 
and burden in the present, as something that has the potential to point forward rather than 
manically backwards, and as something that does not need to be talked about in guilt-
ridden and contrite tones--or else treated as a taboo. Here it is significant not to draw a 
sharp line of division between "Vergangenheitsbewaltigung" ("mastering the past") and 
"Schlussstrichmentalitat" ("mentality of drawing the final line"). They do not exclude 
each other. The question for "nonnality" and of putting an end to this particular (hi)story 
in Germany can more pertinently be formulated as a question of how to integrate a sense 
of the past into some form of "banal" (Billig, 1995) German national identity, but not how 
to exclude the past from present-day memory. In this sense, "nonnality" as a state equals 
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"banality" as a form of sedimented consciousness (nonnality has set in when no-one any 
longer addresses the issue), whereas "normalization" refers to an evolutionary process of 
discourse as well as practice, a process based on the application of a variety of political 
means in order to plead for/achieve the state of "normality". What matters, then, is the 
degree to which German elites and the German people still see (or don't see) themselves·-
much through the imagined eyes of the outside beholder/arbitrator-- as abnormal, 
extraordinary and stigmatized, react in an apologetic way to this extraneously generated 
but domestically internalized self-image, but also--as far as elites go--try to capitalize on 
it in the context of international and European politics. 
II 
It is appropriate to begin these observations on what is often referred to as 'the German 
Question' , the country's way of grappling with its history, identity and self-awareness, by 
making it clear that the author of this piece hails from a country - Denmark - which not 
only has a historically extremely ambiguous relation with its big southern neighbour (see 
e.g. S0e, 1993), but also one typified by a large degree of economic and political 
dependence--to the extent where it was common among Danish elites not many years ago 
to sarcastically refer to changes in Danish financial policies as being dictated on an 
hourly basis by the Bundesbank, by phone or telex, to the Danish foreign ministry. Or as 
another joke, applying a well-known Clausewitz dictum, has it: Denmark is the extension 
of Germany by other means. In the mid-80s a Danish historian phrased the same thought 
in slightly more neutral tones: "Geographically it is easy to see that Denmark is part of the 
North German lowlands. Eric Scavenius 3 once pointed out that Denmark's position in 
foreign-policy terms is dependent on who controls these lowlands. And this has never 
been Denmark [ .. . ). Denmark [always) was too little or Northern Germany too big [ ... ) The 
division of Germany apparently made it possible for Denmark to emancipate itself from 
what had been its destiny, ie being constrained by relations in Northern Germany" 
(Merch, 1985; my translation, DR). 
3Danish foreign minister during WW II 
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Such assessments, with all their inferiority paraphernalia, articulate a very Danish brand 
of half-cynical pragmatism that on the one hand conceals a certain truth-value, on the 
other stands in an oddly inverse relation to the sentimental sovereign ambitions embedded 
in the self-referential, almost hennetic confidence of Danish national identity, 4 its 
traditional aversion to all things Gennan, and its scepticism toward European integration 
and European identity. ' These points are closely linked, for in Denmark European 
integration was for very long--consciously as well as on less manifest levels of awareness 
and evaluation--interpreted as a Gennan ploy for recouping power, sovereignty and 
hegemony in Europe--more perhaps by the masses than the elites, who have by and large 
followed a more pragmatic line of thinking, and certainly of action. 
For both social strata, and viewed from the north, Germany has played a significant 
agenda-setting role, both as a major political actor in Europe eo ipso, but also as a kind 
of "negative touchstone" and very significant Other for Danish identity, wedged between 
(degrees of) dependency and (degrees of) national self-confidence and perceptions of 
homogeneity. From this vantage-point, Germany has very much been seen as and acted 
upon as a European megalith with clearly defined goals and a confident, self-delineated 
trajectory for the future: the teleology of a great power in the making. 
Howeverit is worth turning the tables on this small-nation, peripheral perspective: For this 
interaction between real dependency and a symbolic sovereignty of identity, between 
weakness and strength in Denmark (which as its consequence has had Denmark's well-
known minimalism in issues of European integration in order to ensure the continuation 
of its perception of cultural sovereignty and exceptionalism) can in an interesting way be 
used as measuring rod for gauging the German position on similar matters of national and 
European identity, on weakness and strength, on dependency and self-sufficiency. A 
recent book written in this vein is aptly called The German Predicament (Markovits & 
Reich, 1997). Germany is a country centrally defined along a number of historical and 
4 In the same text, for instance, Seren Merch notes with some Schadenfreude that 
"Germany is divided as never before, but Denmark remains. It has perfected itself..."! 
5 All of this is undergoing significant modifications in the post-Unification and post-Cold 
War era, witness e.g. See, 1993, and Hedetoft, 1995. 
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contemporary dualisms, ambiguities, and inconsistencies, riven between power and 
identity, between leadership and insignificance, and between different medicaments feJr 
these predicaments. In this paper, I want to look at some ofthese briefly, mainly focussing 
on what has happened to the problem of German identity since Unification. (To cl arify: 
I shall limit my remarks to elite perceptions and formulations of German identity wi1h 
respect to European integration. This means that e.g. the much-vexed question of East and 
West German identity constructions, 'innere Einheit' etc., will be less central. This focus 
further implies that the proper term for what I shall address is German "state identity" 
rather than "national identity"; at least it is "national identity" in the perspective of eli te 
discourse and interests. 6) 
III 
It is a well-known fact that not least in the arena of national identity, contemporary 
Germany has been preoccupied with the problem of its abnormality.7 Hence, "nonnaliza-
tion" has gradually tumed into a political and cultural icon in the discourse on Gennan 
identity--a respectable goal to be pursued on a historical backcloth typified by the 
ignominious results of the German "Sonderweg" and the widely accepted contemporary 
context of "European integration". In other words, Europe--in terms of both political 
economy, intemational recognition, and national identity--has, in the post-war era, played 
a variety of significant roles for Germany in its efforts to "normalize", especially to be 
recognised as a normal (read: legitimate and non-aggressive) country by the intemational 
community. 
'For clarification of these tenns, see my discussions in Hedetoft, 1995. 
'It is worth remembering that being non-nonnal is usually an honorary and .. . qui te 
normal epithet of all manner of nationalisms. What else is implied by the application of 
"exceptionalism", to national identities, by themselves? And in IP the normality of realism is to 
pursue one's specific national interests in an anarchic international setting. The point in the case 
of Germany is that its this type of normality is a historical problem, a blemish, and hence 
"abnormal". Hence, the consequent search for and discourse about a return to "normality" is a 
case of blatant national anomie. 
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It is less well known--certainly it is not something that has preoccupied a lot ofscholaIli--
that this very road towards normality contains features that are pretty abnormal and would 
qualify for the use of the term "Sonderweg" in a new setting. This applies both when 
measured against the background of orthodox nation-state objectives and identity 
formulations, and if gauged in the comparative and illuminating light of other EU 
member-states and their programmatic stances vis-a-vis the European project. 
As for the former, this is obvious and well-known: Germany has for most ofthe post-war 
period suppressed most official pride in the nation and direct celebrations of national 
successes in favour of both open manifestations of shame and guilt about its historical 
legacy of nationalism and in favour of highlighting its European orientation and 
"identity"--which thus came to act as the official "supranational" replacement anchor for 
"national" satisfaction, and as the political-economic reference point for Germany's 
endeavour to regain international status. "Verfassungspatriotismus" ("constitutional 
patriotism", a term coined by Dol f Sternberger (1990) and given wide currency by Jiirgen 
Habermas) was for a long spell the only acceptable coinage that could be used to set in 
motion more direct echoes of national identity and pride, but only because it was charged 
with rationality and deliberation, and emptied of explicitly affective, "ethnic" content. As 
for the latter, Germany has widely been recognized as both the most central member-state 
and one that at the same time is reluctant to take full advantage of its power and leadership 
potential : a self-subdued, "tamed" giant (Schwarz, 1985), evincing what William Paterson 
has called a "leadership avoidance complex" (Paterson, 1993), conscious of its historical 
burden and present-day responsibilities, and therefore integration-minded even in cases 
and situations where its interests (certainly in the short term) might have been better 
served by acting in ways more dictated by Realpolitik. 
All this is at least partly true and would, as I said, make the use of the term "Sonderweg" 
quite apt, since it all adds up to a very specific way of interpreting and treating Europem 
integration from the position of national vindication. In the following, however, I want to 
suggest that these major pieces of the German mosaic can be fitted together in different 
way, one that is less concerned with the costs of this "moral" integration avenue for 
Germany (the benefits being "recognition" and "normalcy"), and more concerned with the 
flexibility and manoeuvrability it affords the country. 
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The most significant point is that where in Denmark and many other countries in Europe 
national identity and European supranationality must necessarily be somewhat at 
loggerheads (not necessarily in every single situations, but on the long view), in Germany 
elite national identity formulations and European supranationality complement each other 
in a rather frictionless and productive manner. In an important sense, Gennan elite 
nationalism (interpreted through the prism of national interest perception) at this level is 
very largely identical with a pragmatic form of and discourse about a European 
supranationality, the two being economically, politically and morally coterminous: 
Germany serves its own interests and visions of itself and its future best by embedding its 
political actions, visions and discourses in the framework of Europe. For the same reason, 
Germany can come across and represent itself as a relatively insignificant, weak, 
dependent country, shying away from political and military leadership, paying its moral 
dues, making up for past sins etc., but still in very real terms being an extremely 
influential country with great political and economic clout. 
Until Unification, this was an extremely important feature of German Europeanism, 
Europe acting as an identity crutch and a political-economic bolstering device for German 
rehabilitation and German unification at the same time. This strategy has been referred to 
in a number of ways, as e.g. "soft hegemony", "hegemony by stealth", "reluctant power", 
"civilian power", "semi-sovereignty", "Machtvergessenheit" and much more, and it is 
interestingly the reverse case of Denmark, where real weakness was concealed in a 
discourse of national strength and national sovereignty. Here, Europe was "Other" -land. 
In Germany, Europe was incorporated into perceptions and formulations of German 
nationality, and notions of interest, sovereignty and elite identity fonnulations converged 
under the protective umbrella of European integration and identity, whilst being divorced 
from any notion of a negatively charged "nationalism"; as already indicated, nationalism 
rather emerged as the official discourse of a moderate and "weltoffene" constitutional 
patriotism, which elided any opposition between Gennan interests and European identity--
and to some extent still does, as evidenced in the position paper ("Grundsatzpapier") on 
German interests and identity in Europe produced in May 1999 by CD U leaders W 01 fgang 
Schauble and Karl Lamers, in which they argue that in the long run there is no 
contradiction between Gennan national interests and European unity (see e.g. the 
summary of the paper in Frankfurter Rundschau, May 4, 1999). As argued above, 
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however, there is nothing novel about this--rather the paper formally positions itself in a 
Kohli an tradition prone to highlighting the Europeanness of Gennany rather than the 
Germanness of Europe, but in a public and discursive context which is significantl y 
different from that of the "Kohl era". (For further reflections on this problematique and 
its links to Schroder's "new normality" discourse, see below, section VII.) 
IV 
This should not be understood as in any way implying malignant intent, let alone a 
conspiratorial frame of mind among German elites. It is first of all a reflection of a real, 
but obviously also politically induced, coextensiveness between a German national 
identity which was for very long considered as inappropriate and de1egitimizedper se, 
and a very pragmatic version of European supranationality. It differs from some southern 
variants (induding the French) in being more real and pragmatic in tenns of both 
discourse and substance (intention- and weB as interest-wise). Where the French versi<>n 
glosses over the national interest through a European "universalist" discourse, the German 
makes no bones about the guiding teleology: "Europa lohnt sich flir uns Deutsche" (CDU, 
1984)--"Europe pays offfor us Germans". This is just one manifestation ofa generally 
very open approach by the Gennan political elite to the hoped-for effects of supranationa-
lity for German interests and to the model role ofGennany for Europe, but hence also a 
just as real commitment to European integration and European values (see further below). 
This pragmatic position sometimes produces a very affective discourse ofGennany~s 
European commitment and even quite opaque political acts like the acceptance of be 
EMU in spite of the strength (and symbolic national import) of the Deutschmark. This iis 
frequently explained in tenns of a quid pro quo between Kohl and Mitterrand in the early 
90s, the former gaining French concessions on political integration, the latter gainin.g 
influence on currency-related issues in an otherwise German-dominated Deutschmark 
zone. However, this undoubtedly valid point needs to be supplemented b y other 
perspectives. 
The first is that the European dimension has been integrated into elite thinking i.n 
Germany as long-term political and security-related interests, where the line between 
8 
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I 
what's "German" and what's "European" has to a significant extent been blurred; the 
second--and perhaps causally related--point is that in Germany's case we are faced with 
a power that is in the exceptional situation that it can actually have its cake and eat it t:oo: 
whether Europe moves ahead along one or the other trajectory of integration, Gennany 
can adapt to this, because the others have to adapt to Germany even more. Not primarily 
because Germany is throwing its weight around and pulling the punches of a European 
heavyweight, but because the economic and financial influence, the concomitant political 
power, and the security-related position of Gennany together produce the pivotal 
significance of this country in the middle of Europe. This is a kind of double-bind or d ual 
containment scenario, where the integration project, whether in a homogeneous, mu lti· 
speed, or core-country format, cannot realistically be ditched, and where Germany's role 
is at the center because the Euro can only work as a copycat Deutschmark (at least that is 
the only Euro Germany will accept; and without Germany, no Euro).8 On the other ha nd, 
it does not do to see such policies within the framework ofrealist explanation in neither 
the classical nor the "neo-"sense, but rather through the optic of a new syncreti sm 
between a realist substance/frame of mind and a liberal-institutionalist form: German 
"muitilateralism" (Paterson, 1997). This is truer for Gennany than for any other European 
country, and it rubs off on its identity perceptions, which become remarkably reflexivist, 
integrating images of ' the Other' into definitions of'Self -- even in popular configurations 
of national identity (Hedetoft, 1995, Part 11).9 
8The political means to ensure this are of course, first, the renowned convergence criteria 
that Gennany is paradoxically falling prey to itself, and second the institutional deepening of 
integration that Germany is bent on furthering, including a strengthening of QMV and of the 
position of the large countries in the Council of Ministers. Also, as a kind of unintended 
consequence, Gennany is now for sticking to the EMU agenda, because its failure in a situation 
where the expectations of financial markets have become geared to its introduction would mean 
a disproportionate strengthening ofthe Deutschmark, exacerbating Gennany' s economic situation 
as far as exports are concerned. 
9This does not mean that the reflexivities are substantively the same among the elites and 
the masses, although there are areas of overlap. The most significant difference, however, is that 
they are more discursively and pragmatically in evidence among the elites. 
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Three salient aspects to the Gennan teleology of Europe need to be mentioned: 10 I. The 
commitment to a European framework of values; 2. the reversal of the above mentioned 
pragmatic causality immanent in Gennan supranationality (ie. 'We pursue German 
interests because that is what is best for Europe'); and 3. the elements of genuine 
transnational aspiration in the German pursuit of national interests. 
re I: This comes across very clearly in most Gennan political discourse about Europe. As 
an example, take the following snippets from a small CDU pamphlet from 1984,11 in 
which Chancellor Kohl tried to answer the basic question why "we should say yes to 
Europe" in six different ways. Where the substantive text of the pamphlet as a whole 
would support the national interpretation already offered, still it is encoded in a European 
supranationality of non-material and non-pragmatic nonnativity, almost a cosmological 
discourse which is particularly emphatic in the headers introducing the six arguments (in 
my translation, UH), ego "We say yes to Europe because we have learned from history", 
" ". because we want to reunite Germany", "".because we have made a decision in favour 
of democracy", "".because we want to defend freedom and democracy", "".because we 
want to realize welfare and social justice". This is underpinned by an existentialist rhetoric 
which occasionally refers to Europe as a "community of destiny" (Schicksalsgemeins-
chaft), a term normally reserved for the nation, or as a "political community of values" 
that, in typical Gennan interpretation, is emphatically applied to the area of political 
economy: "All member-states profit from the European Community and hence truly 
depend in an existential [!] fashion on the smooth functioning of the Common Market". 
Such a discourse, combining "profit", "functionalism", "interest", and "existentialism", 
is originally, possibly exclusively, German. 
IOFor a more thorough analysis of this aspect, see my reflections in Hedetoft, 1995, Part 
I, Chapter VII. 
11 Die europiiische Union . 
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re 2: This point is encapsulated in Hans-Dietrich Genscher's by now famous, but still 
obscure (in terms of denotation rather than connotation) reiteration of Thomas Mann's 
dictum, "not a German Europe, but a European Germany"; in a statement by Theo Waigel 
(1992), in which he proclaims that one of the advantages of the EU for Germany is that 
"we are exporting our model of stability to Europe!" (Waigel, 1992); and also ill the 
following statement by Helmut Kohl on the, by then, completed process of Unification: 
"I am convinced that overcoming the division of Germany will be a gain not only for the 
Germans but for all Europeans and will decisively assist European unification" (in Krn.lse, 
1991, p. 308). This kind of argumentation blurs the line between means and end, Europe 
and Germany, national and supranational interests, by constructing both sides as, 
interchangeably, cause and effect, short-term and long-term objectives, or just as ideally 
cotenninous: by pursuing German interests in a particular way one is , eo ipso, pursuing 
the interests and objectives of European unity; the national teleology has a higher purpose. 
An argument often proffered in support of this position is that Germany is more prolle to 
accepting a European federation than, say, Britain, because of its domestic fed.eral 
structure and supposedly weak central power. Hardly a convincing argument: by the same 
token, Switzerland should forcefully support EU federalism. Rather, this is the discursive 
orchestration of a de facto sub-hegemonic power, whose continuity of influences, self-
perception, and meaningful action reaches well beyond its immediate borders, and wluose 
blend between pragmatic and idealist supranationality is not accidentally akin to the "soft" 
cosmopolitanism of Britain in the Pax Britannica or of US global internationalism since 
WW II. Ifwhat is good for "us" is good for "them", then the reverse applies as well: Wbat 
serves the higher goal, also serves our national interests, and the organization of the unity 
of Europe must take account of "us" in no incidental way. Ifby "exporting our model of 
stability to Europe", Europe is served well, it follows that Europe has extensively been 
shaped in "our" image and that any strengthening of European cooperation and integrat ion 
is also a strengthening of Germany. Hence the separation between a "European Germany" 
and a "German Europe" posits a polarity which only makes sense in the moral, normative 
light of a negatively charged history, but which is fictive as regards the configuration of 
benefits, influences and decision-making in Europe measured by the standard of German 
interests. This was true before Unification. It seems to be even more valid today (see the 
following section). 
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re 3: This German interest in Europe further implies that the invasion of the national 
interest by supranational orientations transcends such mere discourse. German moral 
supranationality has a serious component of political intentionality, though this may not 
always be directly reflected in the signs embedded in the discourse itself; rather, this 
discourse often constructs fictive rather than real reasons for German supranationality, or 
confuses means and end (eg. the pursuit of "peace" or "democratic values"). When !Cohl 
(in Krause, 1991 , p. 310) contends that "Cn)ow, as before, our central objective is the 
political unification of Europe. C ... ) a United States of Europe", and Rita Siissmuth, 
President of the German Bundestag, echoes this by arguing that "we have to give Europe 
a new political quality. It can no longer be a loose confederacy" (in Watson, 1992, p . 281 ), 
then this represents an important, bi-partisan (though not exhaustive) body of opinion 
among German political elites. For as Siissmuth goes on to argue in a no less German 
vein, "this is our interest. I know it may appear to many as being typically German, but 
( ... ) we want ( .. . ) a federal Europe. It is in that Europe that we want to see an effect ive 
European Parliament..." (ibid.). 
To reformulate this point: The German national interest is in large measure supranational 
in some loosely defined sense. A "federal Europe" of sorts would guarantee a relatively 
greater political impact by Germany--via its political elite and suitable forms of voting and 
representation--on the decision-making processes in the EU institutions; would be 
continuously underpinned by a dominant economy and a currency "as strong and widely 
accepted as the German mark"; would vouchsafe both stability and security, two celltral 
factors of German post-war politics; finally, the federal character of the construction 
would ensure continued scope for national action ("we definitely do not seek centralisrn 
in Europe" --both statements uttered by Helmut Kohl, as cited in Krause, 1991, p. 309). 
Further, this would represent an avenue towards added influence in world politics witltout 
jeopardizing the classical advantages of a low-profile foreign-policy behaviour. It is hence 
a rational option for a nationally informed German politics of European integration-· 
though not the only possible option. Not only would national interests be structurally 
subsumed under a supranational objective and an institutional form (like the relationship 
between national and community law now) which would guarantee the continuation of 
Germany 's politics of moral identity and low-key behaviour, but this moral umbrella 
would also effectively secure the continuation, not elimination, of German national 
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interests, because, as indicated, Gennany is and remains the sine qua non of such a union, 
its undisputed hub, whilst the remainder of the European compact to all intents and 
purposes constitute the variables of dependency. 
VI 
This analysis of Germany's handling of its identity problems is based on the prior 
assumption that it brings into playa host of different paradoxes and apparent inconsisten-
cies. One of the reflexive dualities of German identity, as mentioned earlier, is that 
between strength and weakness . Another is that between self-assertiveness and modesty 
on the international arena. The configurations as far as these are concemed would seem 
to have changed somewhat since Unification. Not in the sense, as predicted by many 
observers round 1990, that Unification would imply a radical change from appearances 
of weakness and modesty in the past to new realist patterns of behaviour, involving 
notably the shedding of German Europeanism, and making for a go-it-alone power-
balance attitude amongst elites. This was certainly what many feared in Denmark and 
many other member-states: a return to a past dominated by a continental pre-WW I power 
struggle with Germany as the significant player. However, this has never been a serious 
option for the elites in Bonn. 
Whatever changes have occurred should be understood more in terms of Germany both 
self-actuating--but also being pushed by others into--an identity formulation which weds 
Germanism to Europeanism in a way where the latter not just in terms of real power 
distribution, but also open recognition and public discourse becomes the dependent 
variable, unlike the pre-Unification era. In other words, not only do the German elites 
know what the country's position and power is in Europe (this they have known for quite 
a while), but they can now legitimately express it, also as a question of national 
confidence and identity. As the former Chancellor is reported to have proclaimed in late 
1996: "United Germany is number one in Europe. We have about 80m people. We are the 
country with the strongest economy. We are particularly well organised ( ... ) We have our 
pluses and minuses. But taking everything together, we will not [get into trouble] if we 
take our place in the [European] house. Naturally the others accept that we will need the 
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biggest flat" (The Economist, November 9, 1996). Eight years ago what he was reported 
(by the same journal) to have opined was the much more benign, "we are finding our 
national identity through our successful experience with European integration" (July 27, 
1991). 
It has now been found - and at least externally consolidated (internally it is quite another 
question): Germany wants and thinks it deserves "the biggest flat". It expects others to 
recognize this.12 And it says so, particularly forcefully after the advent of the Schroder 
government (see further below). On that basis it is willing to pitch in and consolidate 
European integration - but having a European "identity" is much less talked about these 
days, and in any case was not a German construct from the start (but a French). 
Interestingly, thus, in a very real sense the relationship between (perceptions and 
discourses of) weakness and strength has been turned around: it is the perception of a 
greater and stronger Germany with less to fear toward the east that is at the bottom of this 
rise in self-confident discourse, less the economic, political and military realities. Most 
significantly, the German economy--including the finances of the State--, hitherto the 
staple of Europe, has recently found itself in the doldrums. Domestically, the identity 
question is much more of a real problem than before 1989 (Jarausch, ed., 1997; Pinkert, 
ed., 1998). In this sense, we are observing a weakened Germany, but one with a more self-
confident act internationally--Iess self-apologetic, more explicitly accepting a leadership 
role in Europe (though perhaps less equipped for it now?), but also one stopping short of 
overt chauvinism, partly becaused it is wary of the burden of history and the interpretation 
that "the Others" will put on too self-confident behaviour. 
Germany still may think it is heading for a European Germany rather than a German 
Europe, but increasingly in the post-Cold War world it would seem that this distinction 
has little more than esoteric meaning. The construction and momentum of European 
integration is more than ever dependent on the will and interest of Germany to see itself 
l2Ironically, the article in The Economist from November 9, 1996, was entitled 
"Germany: Too Big For Its Boots?" Apparently, Germany cannot just take for granted that "the 
Others" recognise its natural right to the biggest flat. 
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within this partly supranational context, and to act accordingly. Whether this is a European 
harnessing of Germany or a German harnessing of Europe is really a very acaderYIic 
question, as long as it does not tum into a classical zero-sum game for this core player. So 
far, German elites arere1atively (butno longerunifonnly) content to interpret sovereigaty, 
interest and identity in a European, supranational signifying context, because it still serves 
them well to do so, though possibly less well than earlier, and also because the domestic 
identity conundrum is far from solved; in this context, Europeanism sti1l has an im.portant 
cohesive role to play. By and large elites are still committed to Europe. But Kob.l's 
decision, against powerful odds, to run for reelection in 1998; and his attempts, in 19'97, 
to appreciate Gennan gold reserves and to influence French spending policies, both in 1l:he 
name of rescuing a strong Euro, already then signalled a new elite consciousness, mere 
receptive toward Gerhard SchrOder's European scepticism and less willing j() accept 
Kohl's strategy of "integration at any price". 
VII 
This is not to argue that there is any fundamental, qualitative difference between the Kohl 
and the Schroder governments on this score, but rather that what could be tel1Jll.ed 
Germany's normalization process toward the establishment of great-power self-con fideOlce 
and refonnulating both its relations with the national past and its relations with t:lle 
"international Other" evolved gradually under Kohl and has received a decisive i:mpeltus 
since the Red-Green government came into power in Septemberofl998. The dif:ferernce 
lies less in the formulated end-goal and more in the--political, discursive and stylistic::-. 
means employed to achieve and plead for normality, in a situation where the "negati.. ve 
extraordinarity" of Germany for Germans--particularly the political class-·is subsiding, 
where they are less willing to perceive and treat themselves as a thorn in tile moral flesh 
of Europe, and increasingly refuse to play the game of "Wiedergutmachung" (making LIp 
for past sins) in the same repentant and self-subduing manner as hitherto. What this: meaans 
is that the achievement of nonnality and the recognition of Germany by others asa nom::u l 
country increasingly take the form of applying internationally "nonnal" instruJJJ.ents of 
policy and discourse, and to a lesser extent take recourse to means of exceptional modesty 
and self-conscious acts of "tamed" behaviour. What such a "new nonnality"--as Gerhard 
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Schroder has tenned it--also implies is a reforging and re-instIUmentalization of the 
country' s links with its own, shameful, past; a new pragmatic as well as flamboyant 
(rather than moralizing and visionary) political style and a new political rhetoric of 
confident self-assertion, pivoting around the explicit and repeated articulation of 
legitimate national interests in the European context; and finally a greater degree of 
popular acceptance of such a new discursive and stylistic scenario. I) The transition from 
Kohl to SchrOder thus--in broad and perhaps overly crude tenns, since there is undoubted-
ly more continuity than breach--symbolically marks a change from "nonnalization by 
other means" to "nonnalization by normal means". A few examples of the latter should 
be cited to underpin the argument. 14 
The most significant reference is the heavily foregrounded discourse of "normality" and 
"national interest" with which the Schroder government has surrounded itself. As the 
Chancellor has proclaimed on several occasions, it is time for Germany to regard itself as 
a nonnal country and for others to do likewise, since 'jeder EU-Partner nationale 
Interessen vertreten [dart], nur wir Deutschen durfen das anscheinend nicht" (Welt am 
Sonntag, February 27, 1999)--"every ED partner may clearly defend their national 
interests, only we Germans apparently may not". This has been the ground tenor of 
Schroder' style and discourse since he assumed power, always articulated in a righteous, 
assertive fonn, and interestingly based on the unfairness and injustice perpetrated against 
Germany. Thus it is a moral argument for the application of the "national representation 
optic", where previously this was by and large rejected for precisely moral reasons (i .e. 
the sins of the past). But Schroder's is a moral argument with a pragmatic core: He wants-
-among other things--a reduction of the German contribution to the EU budget, so that 
13 For instance, the ARD Sabine Christiansen talk-show, January 3 , 1999, entitled 
''Kommen die Deutschen?" ("Are the Germans on the move?"), cited a poll taken on the 
following two questions: 1. Are you satisfied with Schroder's more confident style in Europe? 
2. Should Germany have a leadership role in Europe? A large majority ofthe people polled--82%-
-responded affinnatively question no. 1, whereas 61% replied negatively to question no. 2. 
implying thar there might still be a gap between the ambitions of Gennan political elites and 
those of the people at large. 
"The following examples are selective and could be supplemented with others, e.g . the 
citizenship debate, the debate over immigrant quotas and the details of the debate over how t~ 
reform the German "Sozialstaat". 
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he can put his domestic house in order and implement the "third way" between social 
democracy and economic liberalism (politically inspired by Tony Blair and intellectually 
designed by Anthony Giddens--see Giddens, 1999). This does not imply a retreat from 
Europe and European integration--as evidenced by the behaviour and actions of the 
German Government during its Presidency for the first half of 1999, where the budgetary 
demands were much moderated and Agenda 2000 was passed, in spite of the crisis 
following the resignation of the Commission. IS But it does augur a pragmatic, hard-nosed 
and interest-backed approach to German representation in EU matters, as contrasted with 
the moralizing and visionary style of Kohl for the major part of his 16 years in office. 
SchrOder's "new normality" spells a pragmatic, national(ist) approach to integration, 
similar to that allegedly pursued by all other member-states--though the perseverance of 
the normality discourse, i.e the fact that the question is still thernatized, indicates that 
"normality" is a dream not yet achieved by the German state. Further, it indicates 
increasing acceptance of a leadership role in international affairs, including a willingness 
to break with handed-down taboos of politically correct German behaviour in international 
matters of security--a evidenced by German actions, forms of participation, political 
discourse and also popular support for this new proactive line as regards the Kosovo 
debacle in Spring 99. 16 But the "newness" of the "new normality"--despite its apparent 
IlSee also numerous statements by SchrOder, such as "Die Einbindung Deutschlands in 
die Europiiische Union ist von zentraler Bedeutung fur die deutsche Politik" --"the embeddedness 
of Germany within the European Union is of central importance for Gennan policies" 
(Deutschland, 1199, p. 11). This is more thanjust lip-service paid to the European idea, and when 
Schliuble and Lamers--in the above-cited position paper from May 99 (see section III)--try to 
critique the new government's "national normality" discourse by contrasting it with their own 
"European" policy line, according to which there is no contradiction between European 
integration and the long-term interests of Germany, they are in fact erecting a strawman, for this 
is exactly the kind of unabashed pragmatism which also SchrOder applaUds. The only difference 
resides in the rhetorical order in which "Germany" and "Europe" appear on the agenda! 
16 The apparent contradiction between this new political line and the fact that it is 
implemented by a Red-Green government whose major protagonists are all erstwhile pacifists and 
anti -Establishment reformists/revolutionaries of the 1960s and 70s has attracted widespread 
cornment. In contrast, I want to emphasize the inherent logic of this phenomenon. Only a group 
of politicians with the right historical, moral and democratic credentials, known to be critical of 
the use of force and authoritarian rule, would have been able to carry this transition of German 
political discourse and action without a loss of legitimacy ("when such people find the reasons 
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emptiness of meaning and seductive rhetorical qualities--also helps to foreground another 
significant feature of the normalization process, i.e. that "normality" in the context of 
integration and globalization cannot be equated with the values and stability of traditional, 
nation-statist sovereignty, and calls for another political style, because the role and impact 
of national politics--and hence of political leadership--have undergone significant 
transformations. 
VIII 
The changeover from Bonn to Berlin, superficially, symbolizes a move from dependence, 
political "dwarfdom" and semi-sovereignty toward stability, confidence and national 
normality. In one sense--that of mentality, attitudes to German history, and political 
discourse--this picture makes sense. In the light of political culture and transnational 
processes, however, a different reality emerges. 
In this context, "Bonn" (and its major contemporary proponent, Helmut Kohl) signifies 
welfare state, stability, peace and justice, and political as well as social consensus. From 
the perspective of the "Bonner Republik", things appear as controllable, bounded and 
ordered, firmly embedded in the framework of a European unity premised on a stable 
German-French axis. The longevity of Kohl's political rule and the authority that he 
increasingly commanded depended on this typically West Gennan political culture and 
its peculiar blend of "Verfassungspatriotismus", attachment to a modernized idea of 
"Heimat" and a commitment to the Europeanness of German identity. 
"Berlin", on the contrary, and Schroder's political style as well, are emblematic of a new 
phase of internationalization and globalization, one in which the nation-state is less in 
control of economic and political processes, where the significant actors must be located 
in transnational business, international and supranational organizations, NGOs, and of 
course in Washington DC and environs. Processes of globalization are less controllable, 
the welfare state somewhat of an anomaly and attachment to nationalism and political 
compelling enough, they must be!"). 
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stability slightly outmoded. Globalization basically spells flux, instability and Iiminalilly, 
in spite of European institutions which try to reinstate order and transparency in fhe 
context of regional integration. 
In German politics, the fall of Kohl symbolizes the passing of the old, "abnormal" order, 
predicated on European visions and subdued international behaviour toward the outside, 
and on the welfare state in domestic matters. The resignation of Oscar Lafontaine, tlJe 
proponent of welfare, social justice, political regulation and government intervention, in 
March 1999, marks the departure of the last "West Gennan", in this ideological sense, 
from positions of power--history repeating itself "as farce" this time around compared 
with the "tragic" fall of Kohl 6 months earlier. In contrast, Schroder is a true (post)modern 
politician, without significant historical-moral baggage, with a pragmatic attitude to 
European integration, and uncommitted to traditional social-democratic ideology. Hence: 
"They call Schroder 'modem', because no-one knows what he stands for. He is 
'pragmatic' and attentive to the wishes of private business", as the Danish daily> Jyllanr%s-
Posten, symptomatically argued on March 14, 1999. In other words, he is a politician iit 
to rule in conditions of globality, penneability and flux: the "new" nonnality for natio:n-
states in the contemporary world and the necessary basis for action and identity. A.ndmis 
political style, accordingly and intentionalIy,17 is almost the exact opposite of Kohl's_ 
Where Kohl stuck to a dignified, statesman-like style, and rarely moved outside the realm 
of politics proper, Schroder frequently assumes a political style more in keeping wi th 
Americanized showmanship, including appearances on TV quiz programs, at fashion 
shows, film festivals and gala perfonnances in support of German AIDS foundations, 2S 
a soccer commentator on television, and a lot more. To a large extent, style and rhetoric 
have come to replace political content, ideology and morality in Schroder's "New 
Middle", making room--not for a lack ofpolitics--but for greater political manouvrability, 
flexibility and adaptability in more "globalized" political circumstances, and, on the oth.er 
17In an interview with the periodical Deutschland (1/99), Schroder is asked to pinpoint 
the main difference between himself and Kohl, and interestingly replies "Ich glaube derStil,rnit 
dem ich die Regierung flihre, is! modem und zeitgemiiss, er ist rnehr auf Dialog und Kollegia~tiit 
eingerichtet"--"I believe that the style I use in governing is modem and suited to the times, it is 
better adapted for dialogue and interaction between colleagues" (p. 13). 
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hand, for a gradual departure from the moralized, self-deprecating discourse of the Kohl 
era in favour ofa greater attention to the pragmatism of the "German interest" perspective. 
Confident, pragmatic multilateralism--including a domestic "muddling-through" approach 
reminiscent of British politics--is now the word of the day in Gennan politics, and 
political showmanship is the stylistic fonn that this greater national and international 
assertiveness assumes. Thus, the visibility of political leadership has been enhanced, 
whilst any (party-specific) substance or ideological legitimation of politics has been 
somewhat obfuscated. Schroder encapsulates a new kind of German politics less anxious 
than hitherto to make Germany appear as Europe's paragon of virtue, less apprehensive 
of making and admitting the occasional blunder, but also more tough-minded about 
seeking political leadership internationally and being less path-dependent as regards 
adhering to a Kohlian "politics of contriteness" (exemplified well when, during the 
Kosovo conflict in Spring 99, Joschka Fischer at the Green Party Conference in May not 
just legitimated Gennan participation in this anned stand-offby referring to the necessity 
of putting an end to Milosevic's Nazi-like genocide ("No more Holocaust"!)--thus 
instrumentalizing the moralism of German post-war history in a new way and for a 
different set of political goals--but also disavowed part of his own political legacy by 
asserting that "I abandoned pacifism when I was 16"). 
In fact, it can be argued that the Kosovo conflict came as a political godsend for the new 
government in its efforts to shape a new type of German political identity. On the one 
hand, it allowed Gennany to redefine its role in international military and security-related 
questions by appearing to be morally in the right rather than aggressive, and furthermore 
to assume a clear and well-defined leadership role because of its occupancy of the 
European Presidency. In this sense, Schroder's New Pragmatism was given an admixture 
of a New Morality, too. At the same time, the conflict helped to gloss over the problems 
attendant on the resignation of the Commission and the difficulties for Germany in both 
achieving a satisfactory solution to Agenda 2000 and in reconciling its Presidency with 
the government's "we-want-our-money-back" approach to the European budgetary issue. 
Further, it helped the government forge a vision for a new European Security Identity, not 
as separate from but within the overarching structure of NATO, and supported by the 
USA. And finally, it probably helped consolidate the cohesion of the Red-Green 
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government, due to strengthening of Fischer's "Realist" wing of the Greens and because 
it united the government behind an international cause whose moral legitimacy was rarely 
in doubt (except for the last phases of the air campaign, when the final outcome looked 
uncertain, and the question of deploying land troops created unrest among Gennan 
politicians) . 
It is important to stress that the normalization path of German political identity that these 
observations are intended to outline, though it does imply a reassessment of post-war 
history and its politics of memory, does not point toward any historical oblivion or a wish 
to deny German responsibility for World War II. In fact, the point has been made (Herf, 
1998) that e.g. the Walser/Bubis debate on these issues in Fall 98 and the continuing 
preoccupation with the Holocaust--and how to commemorate it--in German public debates 
are an indication that nothing much has changed and that the Schroder Government, in 
spite of its rhetoric, is conducting (identity) politics as usual. However, as I see it, this is 
a misreading of what is happening. Rather, the gist of governmental positions on this score 
and of the entire identity debate in Germany as it has evolved since Fall 98 is that in 
political terms Germany has basically paid its moral dues and that "memory" should no 
longer be allowed to constitute, let alone determine politics to any significant degree, but 
should reside, as memory, in institutionalized forms of the past, i.e. as monuments, 
museums, written records, research, commemorative events l8 and so forth. 
On this reading, there is no attempt in all this to deny or play down the past, but rather to 
separate the past, as history, from the present as politics, and to reinterpret the politics of 
memory as the politics of a dear but now outmoded and no longer viable approach to 
German intemationalism/Europeanism. If and when the past is politically instrumentalized 
(e.g. the Kosovo situation discussed above), it is so less in the spirit of contriteness than 
in one of political assertiveness. Kohl's last period in office started this process, and the 
new government is capping it. Germany is still very much in favour ofEurope--on its own 
terms--, but its political identity as regards Europe is becoming quickly detached frorn 
morality issues and is being replaced by an interest optic which increasingly views 
18Such as the commemoration of the Polish victims of National Socialism by the 
Bundestag on January 27, 1999. (See e.g. Blickpunkt Bundestag, 1199, p.56ff.) 
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European integration--as well as transatlantic cooperation--in tenns of political and 
national expediency. As indicated, this does not mean that "normalization" spells national 
aggrandizement, imperialism or an abandonment of the European project, only that 
German leaders and, it would seem, to some extent "ordinary" Germans too, will no 
longer tolerate having their scope of action and forms of discursive representati~n 
determined by a past that by now seems less morally constraining and hence less 
politically and culturally compelling. Differently put, shame has been conjured up so 
frequently that its effectiveness as a political instrument has been blunted and its 
limitations exposed. 
The cost of this new line of action is the abandonment of the snugness and stability which 
the "tamed giant" approach, in all its abnormality, guaranteed, and conversely ~n 
acceptance of the risks and liminality that accompany, even partly constitute "nonnality" 
in conditions of economic and cultural globalization. Thus, not only is the normality that 
Germany is embracing not tantamount to stability or predictability, but paradoxically it 
is not very normal either. 
IX 
A final word on these developments as viewed from the perspective ofthe Danish elites. 
On the German question they have always been divided, but with a penchant toward 
adopting a pragmatic, cooperative position. Earlier this cooperative spirit smacked a bit 
of grovelling before one's master and doing his bidding. Today there is less of that, alld 
also less internal elite divisiveness. In the 90s, Danish foreign policy has generally 
developed a more independent and more outwardly self-confident tack, and has tried to 
adopt a voice and influence for itself. This has been particularly obvious in the area of 
security and high politics (the Baltics, Bosnian engagements, criticism of human rights 
conditions in China, all-out support for the punitive action taken against Serbia in SpriIlg 
99, etc.), and also internally in Europe. Germany is no longer viewed as a threat (aItd 
hardly with apprehension), partly because German policies are very much in line with 
Danish interests (e.g. eastern expansion, although Germany advocates a slower tempo, 
consonant with deepened integration and institutional reforms), partly because, until 
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recently at least, Germany was still shying away from an overt leadership role in the 
security area where Denmark has particularly tried to project itself. On this count, 
however, developments since the new government took over in Fall 98 have led to a 
partial re-evaluation and, in a moderate degree, to fears ofreawakened nationalism and 
a reduced European commitment in Gennany. For example, the leader column of 
lyllands-Posten, December 30,1998, comments on the politics ofthe "new normality" 
that the political signals emerging from Bonn are substantively understandable and 
legitimate, but the "arrogant tone" employed gives grounds for concern, and winds up by 
arguing that "we have every right to expect something else and something more from 
Germany". The leader is entitled "Gennan disappointments". 
After Kosovo, on the other hand, this possible threat to Gennany's "Others" is no longer 
prominent in the Danish media. If anything, the threat is seen to lie in the possible 
faltering of the German economic "locomotive", on which Denmark and Europe as a 
whole are extremely dependent, and possibly in a German-led core of countries moving 
ahead on a faster track and becoming consolidated as "Euro-Iand", in the process leaving 
non-participants in the Euro by the wayside. But unlike previously, this is not ascribed to 
any fault of Germany's, but to internal splits and indecision in Denmark--and primarily 
to the constraints which the Danish electorate have imposed on political decision-makers 
in the shape of the four opt-outs to the Maastricht Treaty (Hedetoft, 1997). Conversely, 
Germany's quite considerable domestic troubles are facts that, in the field of intercultural 
perception and national stereotypes, tend to downplay even further Danes' traditional 
knee-jerk fear of being dominated by a strong, reborn "Greater Germany". 
Thus, though the German elites in their outward-oriented policies and discourses are 
behaving more confidently than previously, their real difficulties are not passing 
unnoticed, and both Denmark and other countries are perceiving, if not windows, at least 
chinks of new opportunity and manouevre in the troubles ofthe core country in Europe--
not to mention a lesser giant to fear and weaker grounds for the nourishment of hostile 
stereotypes. Denmark might still in geo-cultural terms be part and parcel of the North 
German lowlands, but in a Europe which--despite thejust-mentioned negative calculus--is 
not about zero-sum games but rather about 
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absolute gains across the board, this is no longer a mode of perception that provides a 
deciphering code for geo-political positions in the north. 
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